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ABSTRACT 
 
We conduct a field experiment to assess the impact of two different interventions designed to 
reduce gender biases in student evaluations of teaching (SET). In the first intervention, 
students received a normative statement by email, essentially reminding them that they should 
not discriminate in SETs. In the second intervention, the normative statement was augmented 
with precise information on how other students in the exact same situation had discriminated 
against female teachers in the past. While the pure normative statement had no significant 
impact on SETs, the informative statement appears to have reduced gender biases against 
female teachers. This effect mainly comes from a change in male students’ evaluation of 
female teachers. 
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1. Introduction 
Public policies have made a priority of reducing widespread discrimination2 over the 
past decades. A popular strategy has been to try eliminate biases by changing individuals’ 
beliefs, tastes or values, through awareness-raising campaigns. These campaigns generally 
carry the normative message that people should not discriminate, because discrimination is 
wrong or unfair. Do such strategies work? Maybe not. Biases (that lead to discriminatory 
behaviors) tend to be unconscious (Bertrand et al., 2005; Rooth, 2010; Oreopoulos, 2011). 
Discriminating individuals may therefore not feel that such normative messages apply to their 
own behavior, because they lack information on their own biases. Promoting a normative 
narrative about how discrimination is wrong can even be counter-productive, for instance if it 
includes a “blaming and shaming” approach (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Dobbin & Kalev, 
2013). On the other hand, a more informative intervention designed to make individual biases 
conscious may work.  
In this paper, we present the results of a field experiment in which we tested the 
impact of a normative and an informative message to reduce discrimination. Our research 
focuses on reducing gender biases in student evaluations of teaching (SETs). Multiple studies 
conducted in different contexts have shown that students tend to discriminate against female 
teachers (MacNell et al, 2014; Boring et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2016; Boring, 2017; Mengel 
et al., 2017).3 The experiment consisted in nudging students through two emails designed to 
eliminate biases in evaluations.  
A first email encouraged a group of students to be careful not to discriminate in SETs 
(the “normative” treatment). We designed this strategy to resemble ubiquitous awareness-
raising campaigns. Another group of students received an email that included the same 
message, plus information from a working paper (Boring, 2015) on gender biases in SETs  
(the “informative” treatment). This second message informed students that, in previous years, 																																																								
2 Just to cite a few papers or books that study discrimination in different contexts: wages (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 
1973; Hamermesh & Biddle, 1993; Blau & Kahn, 2017; Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer, 2005), hiring 
(Black, 1995; Phelps, 1972; Goldin & Rouse, 2000; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Riach & Rich 2006; Booth 
& Leigh 2010), job promotions (Lazear & Rosen, 1990); housing (Ondrich et al., 1999; Ewens, Tomlin & Wang, 
2014); the sharing economy (Ge et al., 2016; Edelman et al., 2017); health (Balsa & McGuire, 2001); sports 
(Parsons et al., 2011); crime and prison sentences (Eberhardt et al., 2004; Philippe, 2016); car sales (Ayres & 
Siegelman, 1995); mortgage lending (Ladd, 1998), etc. 
3 Universities often rely on SET scores for promotion and tenure decisions of teachers. They must therefore 
avoid making unfair and inefficient personnel decisions, by ensuring that students do not discriminate. When 
biases are present, universities that persist in using SETs for personnel decisions have two main options. They 
could try to de-bias scores ex post. However, research suggests that the extent of gender discrimination is highly 
context-dependent, making it almost impossible for universities to do so in practice (Boring et al., 2016). 
Another solution is to eliminate biases ex ante, so that the scores objectively reflect the actual quality of 
instruction. In this paper we test this ex ante strategy. 
 
 
3 
students of the same university, in the same context, expressed gender biases in SETs. The 
design of the informative treatment made the students explicitly aware of the presence of 
these biases.  
To test the impact of these messages, we take advantage of the existence of seven 
different campuses in the university to create a difference-in-differences setting. The students 
of two campuses were considered as controls. They did not receive any email during the 
three-week mandatory online evaluation period. Three other campuses were treated with the 
normative message, and the two remaining campuses were treated with the informative 
message. The emails were sent after some students had already completed their SETs. This 
design provides us with a pre-treatment period for all campuses. Finally, the emails were sent 
to a random half of the students in each of the treatment campuses. This feature allows us to 
measure spillover effects of the treatments for the students who completed their SETs after 
the emails were sent.  
The results of the analysis show that the second treatment was effective in the sense 
that it prompted students to increase their evaluations of female teachers, thus reducing the 
gender gap in SET scores. However, we find little evidence that the purely normative 
statement had any significant impact on SET scores. The spillover effect within campus is 
extremely high, especially in the information treatment campuses. One of the reasons why the 
informative treatment may have worked was because it sparked discussions on gender 
discrimination among students, as anecdotal evidence suggests. 
These results show that the efficiency of de-biasing interventions is highly dependent 
on a message’s content. Public policies aimed at reducing discrimination must therefore be 
carefully designed.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. Section 
3 presents the experiment, and section 4 the identification strategy. The main results are in 
section 5. Section 6 discusses the possible mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional setting  
At this French university specialized in social sciences, all first year students are 
required to follow several mandatory courses in history, macroeconomics, microeconomics, 
political institutions (law), political science, and sociology. The experiment took place in the 
fall semester of the 2015-16 academic year. We then study the long run impact on the spring 
semester courses. Each course consists in two hours a week of a large lecture, plus two hours 
a week of work in small groups, called seminars. The administration requires students to 
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complete their SETs online each semester. These SETs remain anonymous to the teachers, 
who cannot trace back SET scores to individual students. Students who share the same main 
lecture all take the same final exam. The final exam grade counts for one third of the final 
grade. The main lecturers design the final exam. The seminar grade counts for the other two 
thirds of the final grade. The seminar teachers design the exercises that will count in the 
seminar grades. Final exams are graded anonymously (double blind) after students are 
completing their SETs for the semester. Seminar grades are not graded anonymously, and are 
given to students before or during the period of time when students are completing their 
SETs.  
Undergraduate students are located in seven separate campuses. At the end of their 
three years of study, they all receive the same degree in social sciences. Paris is the largest 
campus. The other campuses are in Dijon (Central and Eastern European campus), Le Havre 
(Europe-Asia campus), Menton (Middle-Eastern and Mediterranean campus), Nancy (German 
and European campus), Poitiers (Spanish, Portuguese and Latin-American campus), and 
Reims (African and North American campuses). The main difference in the campuses has to 
do with the languages taught in each campus, and the fact that international students are 
admitted to any of the campuses outside Paris (depending on the language they wish to study). 
While students know each other quite well within each individual campus (especially the 
smaller campuses), they generally do not communicate between campuses.  
In this university, male teachers receive higher overall satisfaction scores than female 
teachers. In past academic years (2008-2013), students from the Paris campus have been 
shown to discriminate against female teachers (Boring et al., 2016; Boring, 2017), with male 
students being particularly biased in favor of male teachers. Overall satisfaction scores are 
biased, as well as scores on different dimensions of teaching (preparation and organization of 
courses, class leadership skills, etc.).  
 
3. Presentation of the experiment 
The university’s administration has been seeking ways to reduce these biases to avoid 
penalizing female teachers. Within the context of a European-funded (FP7) project called 
Effective Gender Equality in Research and the Academia (EGERA), the university accepted 
our research proposal, to test scientifically what type of intervention would be more efficient. 
The administration formally agreed to let us run an experiment to test the two different 
treatments.  
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We also received approval for our randomized controlled trials from J-Pal’s 
Institutional Review Board (see appendix). Our research protocol explicitly stated the 
hypothesis we wanted to test: because students may be unaware of their biases in SETs, 
signaling to students that these biases exist could help to reduce them.   
 
 3.1. Treatments 
The goal of the experiment was to test the effect of two different treatments on the 
gender gap in SETs. Both treatments consisted in sending emails to students while they were 
completing their SETs.  
The first treatment (“treatment one”) encouraged students to avoid discrimination, 
especially gender discrimination (full text in appendix). The email started with a generic 
statement about how evaluations are important to help the administration prepare courses for 
the following year. The email then encouraged students to avoid discrimination, focusing 
more specifically on gender discrimination: 
 
“Considering the importance of these evaluations, we would like to remind you that 
your evaluations must exclusively focus on the quality of the teaching and must not be 
influenced by criteria such as the instructor’s gender, age or ethnicity. 
We ask you to pay close attention to these discrimination issues when completing your 
student evaluations.  
The goal is to avoid a situation in which, for instance, gender-based biases or 
stereotypes would systematically generate lower evaluations for women instructors 
compared to their male colleagues.” 
 
The statement did not include any trigger to suggest that discrimination might have 
occurred in this precise context. This treatment resembles many anti-discrimination 
campaigns, whose main message is that “individuals should not discriminate”. If biased 
individuals are not conscious that they discriminate, this type of message is likely to be 
ineffective. 
The second treatment (“treatment two”) added precise information to the normative 
statement, by explicitly telling students that students had been gender-biased in the past, in the 
exact same context. By making students identify with other (biased) students in the same 
context, this treatment may reveal to students that they too might be biased. The second email 
(full text in appendix) drew students’ attention to the research by Boring (2015) “which 
 
 
6 
suggests the existence of gender biases against female instructors of first year undergraduate 
seminars for all fundamental courses” and presented its main results: 
 
“the results of this study show that students tend to give lower ratings to their female 
instructors despite the fact that students perform equally well on final exams, whether 
their seminar instructor was a man or a woman. Male students in particular tend to rate 
male instructors higher in their student evaluations, although a slight bias by female 
students also exists. The differences in SET scores do not appear to be justified by other 
measures of teaching quality, such as an instructor’s ability to make their students 
succeed on their final exams.” 
 
The message included a graph showing that overall satisfaction scores are unrelated to 
student performance on the final exam, and that male students consistently give higher overall 
satisfaction scores to male teachers. The email ended with the same normative reminder as in 
email 1. 
 
 
 3.2. Design 
In order to measure the effect of these two treatments, we take advantage of the fact 
that the university has separate campuses. The design of the experiment is presented in Figure 
1. The first treatment group includes students from three campuses: Menton with 102 
students, Poitiers with 86 students and Reims with 337 students. We assigned the normative 
email (treatment 1) to this group of students. The second treatment group includes students 
from two other campuses: Le Havre with 131 students and Paris with 657 students. We 
assigned the informative email (treatment 2) to students from this second group. The other 
two campuses, Dijon with 101 students and Nancy with 155 students, are the control group 
campuses: students did not receive any emails.  
The response rate is high, given that completing SETs is mandatory. The database 
includes a total of 1,509 evaluations for the treatment one campuses (95.8% response rate), 
2,329 evaluations for the treatment two campuses (98.5% response rate), and 656 evaluations 
for the control group campuses (85.4% response rate). 
We sent the emails to only half of the students of each campus that were part of 
treatments one and two. The students who received emails were randomly selected before the 
beginning of the evaluation process. The different groups and the sample sizes are 
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summarized in Table 1. We use the following notations: group C is the control group (all 
students in Dijon and Nancy); group TT1 (treatment treated 1) includes all students who 
received the normative email; TC1 (treatment control 1) includes all students who did not 
receive the email, but who were on the campuses that were treated with the normative email; 
TT2 and TC2 are similar to TT1 and TC1 but for the campuses where students received the 
informative email. 
We sent the two emails after some students had started completing their SETs, within 
the three-week time span when students were required to rate their teachers. The emails were 
sent when roughly one fifth of the evaluations had been completed: 20.9% in treatment one 
and 22.2% in treatment two. The two emails were sent simultaneously. Some evaluations 
were therefore completed before the treatment, and some other after the treatment in each 
treated campus. The university’s gender equality officer sent the emails. 
 
 
 
3.3. Data 
We ran our experiment in the fall semester of the 2015-16 academic year, on a cohort 
of 1,570 students. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the main student and teacher-
related variables. 60% of the students are women. Almost all students are 18 years old, 
because admission to the first year at this university can only occur right after high school. 
Students tend to receive higher continuous assessment grades (nearly 14 out of 20 on 
average), and lower final exam grades (11.7 out of 20 on average). Many students are French: 
73% have French citizenship (including some who are dual citizens of another country). 
Finally, 32% of students were admitted through the international procedure (they went to high 
school abroad), 10% of students were admitted through a specific procedure designed for 
students coming from lower income areas of France, and 46% were admitted through the 
main admissions procedure. The remaining students are dual degree students.   
Among teachers, 39% are women. Most teachers obtain overall satisfaction scores that 
students qualify as “excellent” (39%) or “good” (40%). Very few overall satisfaction scores 
are “insufficient” (only 6%), while a slightly larger share of students give “average” overall 
satisfaction scores (15%). Overall satisfaction scores tend to be higher in history (3.21 on 
average), than in political institutions (3.09 on average) and microeconomics (3.08 on 
average). 
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4. Identification strategies 
The main objective of the experiment is to evaluate the effects of the two treatments 
on SET scores. The design of the experiment includes three features that enable us to use 
difference-in-differences analyses. First, some campuses are treated while others are control. 
Second, on the treated campuses, the emails were sent after some students had already 
completed their evaluations, generating a pretreatment period. Third, only half of the students 
(random draw) received emails on the treatment campuses. If students who received an email 
on the treatment campuses discuss the emails with students who were not intended to be 
treated, then there might be spillover effects. The identification strategy enables us to measure 
these spillover effects. 
   
 
 4.1. Measuring the effect of the treatment 
We first eliminate any spillover effects by using an analysis that only includes students 
from groups C, TT1 and TT2, i.e. the control group and the groups in which students received 
emails. We exclude TC1 and TC2, i.e. the groups that could be more or less affected by 
spillover effects, depending on the magnitude of these effects. 
Using groups C, TT1 and TT2, we run standard difference-in-differences regressions 
on female and male teachers separately. We use regressions of the form: 
 !"# !,!",! =  !! + !! ∗ !!1+ !! ∗ !!2+ !! ∗ !"#$! +!! ∗ !!! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !!! ∗ !"#$! + ! ∗ !! + ! ∗ !!" + !!,!",! (1) 
 
where !"# !,!",! is the evaluation of teacher te by student s at time t; !"#$! is a dummy equal 
to one if t is after the mailing campaign; !!!and !!! are the two treatment groups;  !! are 
controls for student characteristics; and !!" are controls for teacher characteristics. 
We test whether the emails are effective by observing whether they cause a reduction 
in the gender gap in SET scores. Our variables of interest are !!, which measures the effect of 
the normative treatment, and !!, which measures the effect of the informative treatment.   
The controls and fixed effects determine the variations and the sample used to identify 
the effect. A first (simple) option is to include a limited set of control variables (student’s 
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gender, age, grade). In theory, the difference-in-differences structure is enough to identify the 
effect and, in this case, we can use all the observations from semester one and two. However, 
the measurement could be biased if the pre-treatment SETs concern teachers who share some 
characteristics or are completed by students who also share some characteristics.  
A second option is to include teacher fixed effects in the first specification. The 
advantage of using this specification is that it overcomes the potential bias due to the 
heterogeneity of SET timing based on teachers’ characteristics. An advantage of using teacher 
fixed effects is that male and female teachers do not need to be of the same quality. Our 
preferred specifications are therefore regressions including teacher fixed effects.  
Including teacher fixed effects overcomes the potential bias due to correlations 
between timing and teachers’ characteristics, but not the potential bias due to correlations 
between timing and students’ characteristics. It could be interesting to include student fixed 
effects in the main specification. However, including students fixed effects presents several 
limitations. First, it drastically reduces the power of the regressions by introducing numerous 
fixed effects. Second, students mainly fill all the SET of the semester on the same day. We 
could only measure the effect if we used both fall and spring semesters and the identification 
will come from the difference between the first and the second semester among students who 
filled their evaluation of the first semester before the treatments. For this reason, using student 
fixed effects is only valid if the gender gap would have been similar in the campuses during 
the two semesters in the absence of the treatment. This hypothesis is stronger than the one 
needed when we only use the fall semester – i.e. “the evolution of the gender gap is similar 
before and after the emails in the different campuses” – and could not be tested. Another 
drawback of this strategy is that it mainly measures the medium run effect of the treatment. 
For those reasons we will only use regressions with student fixed effects as robustness checks. 
 
 
  
 4.2. Spillover effect of the treatment and net effect 
 
In the strategy presented in the previous section, we focused on the effect of the 
treatment on the students who received the email in comparison to the students of the control 
group. However, we are able to measure spillover effects through the two groups of students 
(TC1 and TC2) who did not receive an email, but who study on the same campuses as those 
who did. We compare the SET scores of the students who belong to TC1 and TC2 after the 
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mailing campaign, with the control, TT1 and TT2. We do so by running regressions of the 
form: !"# !,!",! =  !! + !! ∗ !!1+ !! ∗ !"1+ !! ∗ !!2+ !! ∗ !"2+ !! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !!! ∗!"#$! + !! ∗ !!! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !"! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !"! ∗ !"#$! + ! ∗ !! + ! ∗ !!" + !!,!",!
 (2) 
 
where variables are similar to those in equation (1). 
As in equation (1), !! and !! capture the effects of the emails on those who received 
them. In addition, !! and !! measure the spillover effects of the emails on TC1 and TC2. In 
equation (4) we are interested in the magnitude and statistical significance of !! and !!, as 
well as in their differences with  !! and !! (respectively). If !! and/or !! are equal to zero, 
then this would mean that the emails have no spillover effects. If  !! (resp. !!) is not 
statistically different from !! (resp. !!) this would mean that the spillover effect is total. We 
run equation (2) separately for female and male teachers. Following the discussion presented 
in section 4.1., the specifications included in the core of the article will include teacher fixed 
effects.  
Lastly, we can measure the net effect of the treatments, i.e. the effect of the treatments 
on those who received emails one or two, and students around them. We run equation (1) with 
T1 and T2 instead of TT1 and TT2. This specification is especially interesting if the 
treatments have a very important spillover effect, and if TT1/TC1 and TT2/TC2 are very 
close. 
 
 
 4.3. Triple difference in difference 
 
Another possibility is to mix the two difference-in-differences strategies into one 
single triple differences strategy. As the results are harder to read when using a triple 
difference in difference, and in order to limit the number of coefficients, we only use this 
strategy to measure the net effect of the treatment. We do so by running regressions of the 
form: 
 !"# !,!",! =  !! + !! ∗!"#$%!" + !! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !1+ !! ∗ !2+ !! ∗ !"#$! ∗!"#$%!" + !! ∗ !"#$! ∗ !! + !! ∗ !"#$! ∗ !! + !! ∗!"#$%!" ∗ !! + !! ∗!"#$%!" ∗
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!! + !!" ∗ !"#$! ∗ !! ∗!"#$%!" + !!! ∗ !"#$! ∗ !! ∗!"#$%!" + ! ∗ !! + ! ∗ !!" + !!,!",!          
(3) 
 
where variables are similar to those in equation (1). 
In this equation, !! and !! capture the effect of the treatment on both male and female 
teachers.  !!" and !!! capture the additional effect of the treatment on women in campuses of 
the treatment 1 and 2 (respectively). 
 
 
 4.4. Balancing checks 
 
Our main identification assumption relies on the fact that the differences between 
students who complete SETs or teachers who are evaluated before and after the emails were 
sent are similar across groups. Fixed effects – teacher, group or student – help to partly relax 
this hypothesis. However, it is also possible to partially test for this assumption directly by 
running balancing checks on observable characteristics of the evaluations. We run regressions 
of the form:  
 !ℎ!"!#$ !,!",! =  !! + !! ∗ !1+ !! ∗ !2+ !! ∗ !"#$! +!! ∗ !! ∗ !"#$! + !! ∗ !! ∗ !"#$! + ! ∗ !! + ! ∗ !!" + !!,!",!  (3) 
 
where !ℎ!"!#$ !,!",! is the observable characteristics of the evaluation filled at time t 
by student s on teacher te and the rest of the variables are similar to equation 1 and 2. 
Regressions based on equation (3) are run on male and female teachers separately. As we are 
interested into the correlation between characteristics and timing, we do not need to 
differentiate between students who received the emails and students around them (i.e. we do 
not need to differentiate between TC1 and TT1 or TC2 and TT2). 
Results are presented in Table 2. All the regressions include teacher fixed effects. We 
mainly run balancing checks on the characteristics of the students. However, grades could be 
viewed as depending on both students’ and teachers’ characteristics.  
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5. Main effects 
 5.1. Graphical evidence 
Before presenting the formal regression model and our main results, we present 
graphical evidence that captures the idea of the main treatment effects. We are interested in 
the evolution of the difference before and after the treatment. In Figure 2, we present the 
average overall satisfactions scores by sex of the teachers and groups, comparing before and 
after the emails were sent.  On average, men’s SET scores are greater than women’s SET 
scores in the three groups. Figure 2 shows more specifically that female teachers’ scores 
increase after the emails were sent (“Female teacher post”) on the treatment two campuses. In 
both the control campuses and the treatment one campuses, female teachers’ average overall 
satisfaction scores drop after the emails, suggesting that treatment one may have had no 
impact on female teachers’ scores on average. Male teachers’ average overall satisfaction 
scores remain relatively constant in the control group (there is a slight drop). Their scores tend 
appear to increase, however, in the treatment one campuses following the email. There is also 
a smaller increase in male teachers’ scores after the emails in the treatment two campuses.  
The graphical evidence therefore suggests that treatment two increases women’s SET 
scores. Furthermore, the emails may have had an impact on men’s scores in both treatment 
campuses.  
 
 
 5.2. Main results  
We first measure the effect of the two treatments on the overall satisfaction scores 
using difference-in-differences analyses, as presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 (for the spillover 
effects). Table 4 presents the main results. Regressions include controls for students’ 
observable characteristics (age, whether the student is French, student’s continuous 
assessment and final exam grades, students’ average grades in other courses, and admission 
type), as well as teacher fixed effects to control, among other things, for teachers’ teaching 
styles.  
The coefficients for the main variables of interest of the regression presented in 
equation (1) for women and men are shown in columns (1) and (2). The dataset is restricted to 
the students who received the emails (TT1 and TT2) and the students of the control group 
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(students from the Dijon and Nancy campuses, who received no email). The results show that 
treatment two increases female teachers’ SET scores (column 1). After the mailing campaign, 
the informative treatment induces a significant increase of 0.26 point for women. Treatment 
one has no significant effect and the effects of treatment one and two are not statistically 
different (see the p-value of the test of equality between the effect of treatments one and two). 
The effects of both treatments on male teachers’ SET scores are not statistically significant. 
In columns (3) and (4), we show the effect of the treatments in all groups following 
equation (2), as well as the p-values of the test of equality of the effects among subgroups. 
Once again, the results suggest that treatment two increases women’s SET scores (column 3). 
This increase is observed both among those who received the email and among those who did 
not receive the emails, but who study on the treatment two campuses. The difference between 
the effects on these two different groups is not significant and the coefficients are similar 
(0.27 and 0.36 respectively). The spillover effect of treatment two seems to be complete. 
Men’s scores do not change significantly following treatment two, and treatment one once 
again seems to have no impact on SET scores of women and men.  
We hypothesized that the informative message was efficient in our context because it 
prompted students to become conscious of the biases that they might apply when completing 
SETs. We have anecdotal evidence that the informative emails generated discussions among 
students, at least on one of the treatment two campuses. At the end of the year (after students 
were done completing evaluations for the spring semester courses), we sent an email to 
students on the Le Havre campus (where one of us teaches a main lecture), asking whether 
they had discussed the content of the email with one another (were there any discussions at 
all)? Or did the email remain largely unnoticed/unread? Some students mentioned that they 
did indeed discuss the email with other fellow students. For instance, one female student said: 
“I remember this email very well because it created a long debate/discussion among my group 
of friends and I.” The feminist chapter of the campus seems to have especially taken-up the 
issue, including on the Facebook page of students on campus. These discussions among 
students explain why we observe a complete spillover effect within campus.  
Given this evidence of within campus spillover effects, we measure the effect of the 
treatments without distinguishing between students directly treated (those who received the 
email) or indirectly treated (those who did not receive the email but who are in treated 
campuses) in columns (5) and (6). Treatment two has a significant effect on women’s SET 
scores, both in comparison to the control group (the coefficient is significant), as well as in 
comparison to the treatment one group (see the weakly significant p-value of the test of 
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equality between the effect of treatments one and two, assuming complete spillover within 
each campus). Finally, this analysis confirms that treatment one does not appear to have a 
statistically significant impact on either women or men. 
These results are further confirmed by triple-differences analyses. Column (7) shows 
the results of regressions including all overall satisfaction scores across all campuses. The 
results show that female teachers in treatment two campuses receive higher overall 
satisfaction scores after emails are sent (the coefficient on !"#$! ∗ !! ∗!"#$%!" shows a 
statistically significant increase of 0.28 point).  
 
 
 5.3. Robustness checks  
To further test the robustness of our findings we measure the effect of the treatments 
using different models or different variables, in Table 5. Columns (1) to (3) present the results 
when we use a dummy equal to one if SET scores are good or excellent. Columns (4) to (6) 
present the main results while using ordered logit regressions instead of OLS. In columns (7) 
to (12) the sample size is extended to the SET filled during both the fall and spring semester. 
Columns (7) to (9) present the results when regressions include controls for student fixed 
effects instead of teacher fixed effects. Lastly, in columns (10) to (12), regressions include 
both student and teacher fixed effects. For each robustness check, we first present the results 
of the difference-in-differences on women and men in two separate columns and the last 
column presents the results of the triple difference in difference. All the results presented in 
table 5 give the net effect of the treatments: TC1 and TT1 as well as TC2 and TT2 are not 
distinguished. Results are similar to the ones observed in Table 4. In the four robustness 
checks, we find that treatment one has no effect while treatment two increases SET scores for 
women. Moreover, the magnitudes of the results are similar to those observed in table 4. 
In another series of robustness checks, we include only one of the treated campuses at 
a time with the two control campuses (Table 6). The results are not consistent across the 
treatment one campuses. Indeed, in Poitiers, the overall satisfaction scores for both women 
and men increase following the emails (weakly significant for men). The results are consistent 
for the treatment two campuses however: the scores of women (and only women) 
significantly increase in both the Paris and Le Havre campuses following the email. The 
effect appears to be larger in Le Havre. This is due to the fact that women in the pre email 
period on this campus have much lower SET scores compared to men, and compared to 
teachers in the Paris campus.  
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6. Mechanism 
 6.1. Effect of the treatment by student and teacher gender 
We first focus on the differences of the effects based on student gender. Indeed, 
Boring (2017) found that male students were the ones who had a bias in favor of male 
teachers, which generated the higher overall satisfaction scores for male teachers. The email 
sent in treatment two explicitly referred to this difference among students. We therefore check 
whether male students, who were more specifically targeted in the email of treatment two, 
react more. 
We start by presenting graphs of the overall SET score by sex of the teachers and 
groups – as in figure 2 – for male and female student separately. The graphs are presented in 
figure 3.a. (male students) and 3.b. (female students). Among female students, the satisfaction 
scores for men slightly increase in all groups. Women’s scores decrease in groups C and T1, 
and slightly increase in T2. Among male students, two evolutions are striking: male teachers 
have significantly better scores after the treatment 1 while female teachers have significantly 
better scores after treatment 2. The graphical evidence presented in figures 3 suggest that the 
effect of the treatment mainly comes from male students. They also suggest that the 
normative treatment may have increased the gender discrimination among male students. 
In order to further investigate these hypotheses, we run the difference-in-differences as 
well as the triple differences on male and female students separately. Results are presented in 
Table 7. All regressions include teacher fixed effects as well as controls for students’ 
characteristics. The results confirm that the effect of the treatment comes from male students. 
Both the results from difference-in-differences and triple differences show that female 
teachers receive higher overall satisfaction scores after treatment two because male students 
increase their evaluations for women. The results also suggest that male students increase the 
scores they give to female teachers following treatment one. However, this result is only 
observed while using difference-in-differences (column 1), and it is not confirmed by triple 
differences  (column 5).  
In contradiction with figure 3a, the regressions do not support the idea that male 
students tend to give better evaluations to male teachers after treatment one. Lastly, the emails 
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appear to have had no statistically significant impact on female students’ evaluations of both 
female and male teachers.  
 
  
 
 6.2. Other dimensions of the evaluations 
Until now, we only focused on overall satisfaction scores. However, the complete 
evaluations are composed of thirteen other questions. These questions are more precise and 
cover students’ opinions on teachers’ effectiveness on different dimensions of teaching. 
Boring (2015) finds that the dimensions that students value in men and women tend to 
correspond to gender stereotypes. For example, women get better scores in teaching 
dimensions such as course preparation and organization, while men get better scores in 
“contribution to intellectual development” and class leadership skills.  
We explore the net effect (with the full sample and T1 and T2 instead of TT1 and 
TT2) of the treatment on these dimensions using triple differences following equation (3). 
Results are presented in Table 8. All regressions include teacher fixed effects. 
Surprisingly, while only treatment two decreased the gender gap on overall 
satisfaction scores, the two different treatments seem to have the same effect, and may have 
reinforced gender stereotypes. Women’s scores in “quality of instructional materials” or 
“clarity of course assessment” are significantly better after both treatments, while all teachers’ 
scores in “contribution to intellectual development” are significantly better after the treatment. 
Other teaching dimensions do not seem to be impacted.  
 
 
 
 6.3. Heterogeneity of the effects 
We document the heterogeneity of the effects of the treatments along three 
dimensions: teachers’ quality, students’ quality and fields. Results are presented in Table 9 
using triple difference in differences analyses.  
First, columns (1) and (2) include results of regressions separating the better teachers 
from the other teachers. We define a “good teacher” as a teacher who generated more learning 
in students, measured as a teacher whose students received higher average grades on the final 
exam (above the median grade in the campus). Although results are weakly significant, the 
higher quality female teachers are the ones who are especially benefitting from the higher 
overall satisfaction scores with treatment two.  
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Second, we measure whether “good” students react differently (columns (3) and (4)). 
We define “good” students as those who get final grades above the median on campus. We 
use regressions similar to the ones used for “good teachers”. This analysis does not yield 
statistically significant results, suggesting that both types of students may be increasing the 
overall satisfaction scores of female teachers. 
 Lastly, we separately measure the effect of the treatments by course – economics, 
history and law (fall semester courses). The number of female teachers varies largely. While 
they are 51% of the teachers in economics, they are only 36% in history and 29% in law. 
Sample sizes are small and all the results are non significant. However, the coefficient for law 
is slightly smaller than the ones for economics and history. 
 
  
 
1. Conclusion 
 
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from this field experiment is that the 
content of an awareness-raising campaign is important. Indeed, a poorly designed message 
can be ineffective or, worse, actually generate an increase in discrimination. The persistence 
of discrimination may be surprising given the millions of dollars spent every year by firms 
and governmental agencies on diversity training, as well as by governmental and non-
governmental organizations on anti-discrimination campaigns. Our results suggest that these 
campaigns, which resemble our normative treatment, are likely to be inefficient. Similar 
results have been found on the efficiency of awareness-raising health campaigns.4 Recent 
research has also studied strategies to counter “alternative facts”, finding that trying that 
presenting voters with the true facts can actually backfire and generate extra political support 
for the politicians who promoted alternative facts (Barrera et al., 2017).  
We focus on a strategy to this research provides evidence from the field that “de-
biasing” strategies might be effective. Indeed, while a few laboratory experiments using 
implicit association tests have studied such strategies (Paluck & Green, 2009), there has been 
scant evidence that these strategies work in the field (Moss-Racusin et al. 2014; Bertrand & 
Duflo 2017). Our experiment contributes to the research asking whether it is possible to 
reduce discrimination by changing individuals’ beliefs, tastes or values through awareness-																																																								
4 Horne et al. (2015) study information campaigns designed to reduce anti-vaccination beliefs, and find that 
campaigns that attempt to refute vaccination myths are inefficient, sometimes even counter-productive—
generating more people to hold anti-vaccination beliefs (Nyhan et al., 2014; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). However, 
Horne et al. (2015) find evidence that campaigns providing factual evidence on the negative consequences of 
communicable diseases (such as measles) on children can efficiently lead parents to vaccinate their children. 
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raising campaigns. Other research has focused mainly on reducing discrimination by studying 
changes in the settings or rules in which discriminatory decisions are made. For instance, 
Goldin and Rouse (2000) show how having “blind” auditions helped to reduce discrimination 
against female candidates in orchestras. Blind performance evaluations are hard to apply in 
most workplace contexts however. Other researchers have studied the impact of increasing 
the number of women in hiring committees or in the hierarchy (Kunze & Miller, 2014) on 
discrimination in women’s employment opportunities or promotions. Another solution is to 
implement gender quotas on hiring and promotion committees. This solution has yielded 
mixed results: under some circumstances, adding women to an evaluating committee can 
actually be more harmful to the women being evaluated (Bagues, et al., 2017). In yet another 
solution, Bohnet et al. (2015) suggest that conducting joint evaluations may reduce biases 
compared to separate evaluations (for which evaluators may rely more on group stereotypes). 
However, other research suggests that evaluators may shift their decisions of the criteria that 
they find to be the most important, in order to fit their evaluations with their gender biases, a 
phenomenon called casuistry (Norton et al., 2004). Furthermore, providing evaluators with 
information on a candidate’s past performance does not completely eliminate discrimination 
in stereotypically male fields (Reuben et al., 2014). Finally, others have studied the impact of 
anti-discrimination laws (Collins, 2003, 2004). 
Discrimination persists in contexts in which economic agents (employers, customers, 
students, etc.) evaluate the quality of women’s and minorities’ work or qualifications. 
Personnel decisions based on discriminatory behavior are therefore economically inefficient. 
Employers may make suboptimal hiring decisions based on stereotypes, for instance hiring 
less qualified individuals because their identity corresponds to the stereotype of the dominant 
group in a field (for instance, favoring less qualified men in science over more qualified 
women, Reuben et al., 2014). Individuals who expect to be discriminated against may also 
choose to underinvest in their education or development of skills, because they believe that 
discrimination will cause the returns to their human capital investment to be low. Reducing 
discrimination could therefore boost the economy (Cavalcanti & Tavares, 2016). For instance, 
the think tank France Stratégie estimates that reducing workplace discrimination against 
women and minorities could lead to a €150 billion increase in France’s GDP over a twenty-
year period, i.e. approximately a 7% increase in GDP (Bon-Maury et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
the growth of the share economy in recent years has increased the relevance of this field of 
research. Several recent studies have found evidence of large discrimination in this area. For 
instance, Edelman et al. (2017) find evidence of racial discrimination against African-
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Americans making housing requests on Airbnb. Ge et al. (2016) also find evidence of 
discrimination against African-American users of Lyft and Uber. As online rating platforms 
develop, reducing discrimination in evaluations is becoming increasingly important. 
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Figure 1: design of the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean SET scores by period, teacher gender, and groups 
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Figure 3.a.: Mean overall satisfaction scores by male students, before vs. after, by 
teacher gender and groups 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.b.: Mean overall satisfaction scores by female students, before vs. after, by 
teacher gender and groups 
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Table 1. Description of the experiment 
   
Number of evaluations 
Group   E-mail type 
 Number of 
students All 
Before 
email After mail 
After mail, 
treated 
After mail, 
spillover 
Control None 256 654 205 449   
Treatment one Normative 525 1,509 315 1,194 617 577 
Treatment two Informative 788 2,329 518 1,811 906 905 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics students 
 Mean S.d. 
Students   
Share of women .60 .49 
Age 18.17 .79 
Continuous assessment (seminar) grade 139.86 22.46 
Final exam grade 116.81 34.35 
Share of students with French citizenship .73 .44 
Share of students admitted specific procedure .10 .31 
Share of students who took the entry exam .46 .50 
Share of students from international procedure .32 .47 
Teachers   
Share of women .39 .49 
Share of "excellent" overall satisfaction scores .40 .49 
Share of "good" overall satisfaction scores .38 .49 
Share of "average" overall satisfaction scores .15 .36 
Share of "insufficient" overall satisfaction scores .06 .24 
Overall satisfaction scores in history 3.21 .82 
Overall satisfaction scores in law 3.09 .93 
Overall satisfaction scores in micro 3.08 .91 
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Table 3. Balancing checks 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12)   (13) (14)   (15) (16) 
	 Student female 	 Note final grade 	 Note continuous assessment 	 Age 	 French citizenship 	 Entry exam waived 	 Entry exam 	 International procedure Professor Women Men   Women Men   Women Men   Women Men   Women Men   Women Men   Women Men   Women Men 
                        
post 0.038 -0.004 	 -5.253 -3.832 	 -2.592 -5.478*** 	 0.276** 0.252*** 	 -0.060 -0.017 	 -0.036 -0.005 	 0.0221 -0.035 	 0.000617 0.0331 	 (0.064) (0.056) 	 (4.092) (3.326) 	 (3.176) (2.031) 	 (0.119) (0.097) 	 (0.062) (0.0576) 	 (0.023) (0.016) 	 (0.0550) (0.047) 	 (0.0577) (0.0506) post*T1 -0.112 -0.087 	 1.817 -2.009 	 -2.249 0.475 	 -0.087 -0.123 	 -0.0375 -0.160** 	 0.0274 0.006 	 -0.184** -0.191*** 	 0.0875 0.0815 	 (0.080) (0.069) 	 (4.986) (4.143) 	 (3.644) (2.811) 	 (0.140) (0.112) 	 (0.078) (0.070) 	 (0.028) (0.025) 	 (0.0722) (0.063) 	 (0.0740) (0.0654) post*T2 -0.006 0.023 	 2.182 2.912 	 -3.141 2.920 	 -0.126 -0.126 	 -0.0232 -0.056 	 0.087** -0.003 	 -0.114* 0.031 	 0.0179 -0.0103 	 (0.077) (0.064) 	 (4.956) (3.907) 	 (3.654) (2.342) 	 (0.127) (0.102) 	 (0.0649) (0.059) 	 (0.038) (0.028) 	 (0.0655) (0.055) 	 (0.0600) (0.0519) 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Obs 1,733 2,763 	 1,727 2,746 	 1,733 2,763 	 1,733 2,763 	 1,733 2,763 	 1,733 2,763 	 1,733 2,763 	 1,733 2,763 pval T1 T2 0.101 0.030 		 0.927 0.126 		 0.726 0.281 		 0.647 0.965 		 0.772 0.0123 		 0.073 0.785 		 0.239 1.04e-05 		 0.158 0.0330 
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Table 4. Main effects, fall semester courses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Women Men Women Men Women Men All 
                
Post -0.079 0.016 -0.077 0.021 -0.078 0.021 0.025 
 
(0.090) (0.078) (0.090) (0.076) (0.090) (0.076) (0.077) 
post*TC1 
  
0.20 0.070 
   
   
(0.14) (0.11) 
   post*TT1 0.091 0.17 0.083 0.17 
   
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
   post*TC2 
  
0.36*** 0.018 
   
   
(0.13) (0.096) 
   post*TT2 0.26** 0.054 0.27** 0.053 
   
 
(0.13) (0.099) (0.13) (0.098) 
   post*T1 
    
0.14 0.10 0.10 
     
(0.11) (0.097) (0.098) 
post*T2 
    
0.31*** 0.035 0.033 
     
(0.11) (0.087) (0.088) 
post*female 
      
-0.11 
       
(0.12) 
post*female*T1 
      
0.027 
       
(0.15) 
post*female*T2 
      
0.28** 
       
(0.14) 
        Observations 1,025 1,542 1,725 2,745 1,725 2,745 4,470 
pval T1 T2 0.19 0.33 
  
0.067 0.37 
 pval TC1 TT1 
  
0.41 0.40 
   pval TC2 TT2 
  
0.47 0.68 
   pval TT1 TT2     0.14 0.30       
Diff-in-diff  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Triple diff  Yes 
Note: all regressions include teacher fixed effects and control variables for students (student gender, age, 
whether the student is French, variables to control for academic ability, and variables to control for admissions 
type). 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Dummy Ordered logit regressions Fall and spring smester Student fixed effects 
Fall and spring smester 
Teacher and student fixed effects 
  Women Men All Women Men All Women Men All Women Men All 
    
  
 
  
  
  
   post -0.036 0.0069 0.0087 -0.21 0.0027 0.012 -0.28* 0.055 -0.048 -0.19* -0.046 -0.067 
 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.090) 
post*T1 0.055 0.036 0.042 0.37 0.34 0.34 -0.067 -0.19 -0.034 0.24 0.061 0.14 
 
(0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.35) (0.29) (0.29) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) 
post*T2 0.15*** 0.016 0.014 0.87** 0.10 0.094 0.42** -0.084 0.029 0.33** 0.022 0.020 
 
(0.051) (0.041) (0.041) (0.34) (0.26) (0.26) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) 
post*female 
  
-0.048   
 
-0.26 
  
-0.17 
  
-0.065 
   
(0.053)   
 
(0.35) 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.11) 
post*female*T1 
  
0.0053   
 
0.027 
  
-0.058 
  
0.0035 
   
(0.071)   
 
(0.44) 
  
(0.19) 
  
(0.15) 
post*female*T2 
  
0.14**   
 
0.82** 
  
0.36** 
  
0.29** 
   
(0.065)   
 
(0.41) 
  
(0.17) 
  
(0.14) 
    
  
 
  
  
  
   Observations 1,727 2,746 4,473 1,727 2,746 4,473 3,465 5,190 8,655 3,202 5,100 8,630 
pval T1 T2 0.050 0.55   0.065 0.27   0.0092 0.44   0.50 0.68   
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Table 6. Robustness checks, using one treated campus at a time with both control campuses 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Menton Reims Poitiers Paris Le Havre 
 
Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men 
                      
post -0.042 0.017 -0.077 0.015 -0.067 0.0069 -0.074 0.033 -0.071 0.029 
 
(0.092) (0.075) (0.089) (0.074) (0.090) (0.073) (0.090) (0.076) (0.090) (0.076) 
Post*T1 0.33 -0.057 0.061 0.10 0.33** 0.26* 
    
 
(0.45) (0.21) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) 
    Post*T2 
      
0.26** 0.045 0.66*** -0.013 
       
(0.11) (0.088) (0.22) (0.13) 
           Observations 397 543 700 922 405 498 991 1,593 422 618 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Table 7: Effect of the treatment by student and teacher gender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Student Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
Teacher Female  Female  Male  Male  All All 
              
post -0.11 -0.046 0.0051 0.021 -0.34 0.14 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.28) (0.21) 
post*T1 0.40** -0.016 0.24 0.074 0.36 -0.024 
 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.36) (0.24) 
post*T2 0.47*** 0.18 0.045 0.041 0.011 -0.12 
 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.31) (0.24) 
post*female 
    
-0.13 -0.0087 
     
(0.18) (0.16) 
post*female*T1 
    
0.10 -0.0055 
     
(0.29) (0.20) 
post*female*T2 
    
0.41* 0.12 
     
(0.23) (0.20) 
       Observations 711 1,016 1,055 1,691 1,746 2,676 
pval T1 T2 0.68 0.11 0.15 0.71 
  pval male vs female student T1 0.070 0.40 
  pval male vs female student T2 0.19 0.98     
Note: Fall semester only. All regressions include control variables and teacher fixed effects. 
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Table 8. Effect of the treatment on different dimensions of teaching 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 
Preparation 
and 
organization 
Quality of 
instructional 
materials 
Clarity of 
course 
assessment 
criteria 
Usefulness 
of feedback 
Quality of 
animation 
Ability to 
encourage 
group work 
Availability 
and 
communication 
skills 
Ability to 
relate to 
current 
issues 
Contribution 
to 
intellectual 
development 
Investment Number of grade 
Deadline 
correction 
(oral exam) 
Deadline 
correction 
(written 
exam) 
                            
post -0.075 0.13 0.0031 -0.014 -0.062 0.31** 0.021 0.078 -0.080 0.047 0.085 -0.041 0.0073 
 
(0.075) (0.10) (0.094) (0.10) (0.078) (0.15) (0.094) (0.12) (0.080) (0.064) (0.063) (0.043) (0.046) 
post*T1 0.20** -0.085 0.16 0.0063 0.19* -0.11 0.052 0.0051 0.30*** 0.0057 -0.043 0.10** 0.039 
 
(0.097) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.081) (0.078) (0.052) (0.057) 
post*T2 0.077 -0.094 0.058 0.064 0.11 -0.29* 0.022 -0.035 0.15* 0.0022 -0.075 0.037 -0.016 
 
(0.086) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.090) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.093) (0.073) (0.074) (0.046) (0.050) 
post*female 0.079 -0.32** -0.24* -0.060 0.13 -0.057 -0.062 -0.055 0.044 0.048 -0.24** 0.028 -0.062 
 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.23) (0.15) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.050) (0.055) 
post*female*T1 -0.15 0.32* 0.32* 0.24 -0.12 0.11 0.054 0.096 -0.088 -0.14 0.19 -0.025 -0.012 
 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.065) (0.074) 
post*female*T2 -0.018 0.41** 0.28* 0.19 -0.024 0.17 0.13 0.090 0.048 -0.053 0.27** -0.019 0.064 
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.25) (0.17) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.057) (0.062) 
              Observations 4,472 4,473 4,472 4,473 4,472 4,466 4,470 4,470 4,473 4,473 4,471 4,472 4,463 
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Table 9. Heterogeneity of the effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Teacher's quality Student's level Field 
 
> median < median > median < median Law Economics History 
                
post 0.028 0.030 0.067 -0.033 0.011 0.086 0.011 
 
(0.12) (0.100) (0.12) (0.099) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) 
post*T1 0.19 0.076 0.013 0.21 0.065 0.046 0.17 
 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) 
post*T2 -0.0016 0.066 -0.030 0.081 0.091 -0.080 0.038 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) 
post*female -0.14 -0.066 -0.011 -0.24 -0.092 -0.20 0.13 
 
(0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.31) 
post*female*T1 0.083 -0.11 -0.11 0.17 0.13 0.11 -0.31 
 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.27) (0.35) 
post*female*T2 0.32* 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.18 0.27 0.26 
 
(0.18) (0.25) (0.19) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.34) 
   
    
   Observations 2,154 2,319 2,369 2,104 1,518 1,487 1,468 
Note: a teacher is defined as good when the average grade of his students at the final exam is 
above the average grade in the campus. A student is defined as good when his grade is above 
average grade in the campus. 
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Appendix 1. The Two Emails Sent 
 
 
Mail 1 : 
 
Cher(e) étudiant(e), 
 
Les évaluations en ligne des enseignements sont ouvertes depuis le lundi 23 novembre 2015. 
Le remplissage de ces évaluations fait partie de vos obligations de scolarité.  Comme il vous 
l’a été précisé dans l’email signalant l’ouverture des évaluations en ligne, les informations que 
vous complétez sont lues par les enseignant-es et utilisées avec beaucoup d'attention par la 
Direction des études et de la scolarité afin de préparer chaque rentrée universitaire. Vos 
appréciations permettent en particulier à la direction de Sciences Po d'améliorer, en lien étroit 
avec les équipes pédagogiques, la qualité de nos formations. 
 
Il convient à ce titre de rappeler que les évaluations ne doivent porter que sur la qualité des 
enseignements et qu’elles ne doivent pas être influencées par des facteurs tels que le sexe, 
l’âge ou l’origine ethnique des enseignant(e)s. Nous vous demandons de faire tout 
particulièrement attention à ces questions de discriminations afin d’éviter que, par exemple, 
les enseignantes soient systématiquement moins bien notées que leurs homologues masculins 
en raison de biais ou de stéréotypes de genre. 
 
Nous vous prions de croire, cher(e) étudiant(e), à l'assurance de nos sentiments les meilleurs. 
 
Dear Student, 
This fall semester’s student evaluations of teaching are open since Monday November 23rd. These 
evaluations, which are mandatory for students to complete, are read by your instructors and closely 
analyzed by the Direction des études et de la scolarité in order to prepare the upcoming academic year. 
Your comments are extremely useful for the administration of Sciences Po in order to improve the quality 
of our programs, in close collaboration with our teaching staff. 
Considering the importance of these evaluations, we would like to remind you that your evaluations must 
exclusively focus on the quality of the teaching and must not be influenced by criteria such as the 
instructor’s gender, age or ethnicity. We ask you to pay close attention to these discrimination issues when 
completing your student evaluations. The goal is to avoid a situation in which, for instance, gender-based 
biases or stereotypes would systematically generate lower evaluations for women instructors compared to 
their male colleagues. 
Best regards, 
Hélène Kloeckner 
Chargée de la communication interne / Référente égalité femmes-hommes 
 
Direction de la communication / Secrétariat général 
27 rue Saint-Guillaume 75337 Paris cedex 07 France 
T. +33 (0)1 45 49 59 86 / M. +33 (0)6 73 76 32 96 
helene.kloeckner@sciencespo.fr 
www.sciencespo.fr  
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Mail 2 : 
Cher(e) étudiant(e), 
 
En cette période d’évaluation des enseignements nous souhaitons attirer votre attention sur les 
résultats d’une recherche récente menée à Sciences Po mettant en évidence un biais 
discriminatoire à l’encontre des femmes enseignant les conférences de méthode pour les 
modules fondamentaux de première année. 
 
Il s’avère en effet qu’à résultat égal aux examens, les élèves tendent à moins bien noter les 
enseignantes. Cet écart s’observe en particulier de la part des élèves hommes bien que les 
élèves femmes présentent également un biais. Ces écarts ne semblent pas justifiés par d’autres 
mesures de la qualité d’un enseignement, telle que la capacité d’un(e) enseignant(e) à faire 
réussir ses élèves aux examens de fin de semestre. 
 
Prenons par exemple le cas d’élèves obtenant 13,5 de moyenne en conférence de méthode et 
12 à l’examen final (ce qui correspond aux moyennes observées sur la période d’étude 2008-
2013, tous modules fondamentaux confondus). Pour ces élèves, les enseignantes ont 30% de 
chances d’obtenir un score de « satisfaction globale » qualifié d’excellent, quel que soit le 
sexe de l’étudiant (et à caractéristique d’enseignement constant, par exemple le jour et l’heure 
du cours). En revanche, pour ces mêmes notes en contrôle continu et à l’examen final, les 
enseignants obtiennent un score de satisfaction globale qualifié d’excellent dans 33% des cas 
s’ils sont évalués par une femme et même dans 42% des cas s’ils sont évalués par un homme. 
Cela signifie qu’à résultats des élèves égaux, les enseignantes obtiennent d’excellentes 
évaluations environ 19% moins souvent que leurs homologues masculins (compte tenu de la 
proportion moyenne d’élèves femmes et hommes).  Ces différences sont statistiquement 
significatives.  
 
Par ailleurs, quelle que soit la note obtenue à l’examen final, les élèves hommes évaluent 
systématiquement mieux les enseignants hommes, comme le montre le graphique ci-dessus.  
 
 
Graphique : Corrélation entre note à l’examen final et probabilité prédite d’un score 
« excellent » en satisfaction globale 
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Enfin, les résultats de cette étude suggèrent que les élèves appliquent des stéréotypes de genre 
dans la façon dont ils répondent aux questions plus précises (notamment la question portant 
sur la qualité de l’animation et celle portant sur la contribution au développement 
intellectuel).  
 
Au regard de ces résultats, il convient de rappeler que les évaluations ne doivent porter que 
sur la qualité des enseignements et qu’elles ne doivent pas être influencées par des facteurs 
tels que le sexe, l’âge ou l’origine ethnique des enseignant(e)s. Nous vous demandons de faire 
tout particulièrement attention à ces questions de discriminations afin d’éviter que, par 
exemple, les enseignantes soient systématiquement moins bien notées que leurs homologues 
masculins en raison de biais ou de stéréotypes de genre. 
 
Nous vous prions de croire, cher(e) étudiant(e), à l'assurance de nos sentiments les meilleurs. 
 
 
Dear Student, 
 
In this period of student evaluations of teaching (SET), we would like to bring your attention to the 
results of a recent study which suggests the existence of gender biases against female instructors of 
first year undergraduate seminars (i.e. the conférences de méthode) for all fundamental courses.  
 
Indeed, the results of this study show that students tend to give lower ratings to their female instructors 
despite the fact that students perform equally well on final exams, whether their seminar instructor 
was a man or a woman. Male students in particular tend to rate male instructors higher in their student 
evaluations, although a slight bias by female students also exists. The differences in SET scores do not 
appear to be justified by other measures of teaching quality, such as an instructor’s ability to make 
their students succeed on their final exams.  
 
Let’s take the example of students whose seminar average grade is 13.5 and the final exam grade is 12 
(these grades correspond to the student averages observed during the period 2008-2013, pooling all 
fundamental courses together). Given these students, female seminar instructors have a 30% chance of 
obtaining an “excellent” overall satisfaction score, from both male and female students (and keeping 
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5 
constant course characteristics, such as the day and time of class). Given these grades, however, male 
instructors have a 33% of obtaining an “excellent” overall satisfaction score when evaluated by a 
female student and even a 42% chance when evaluated by a male student. These results mean that 
given an equal performance on exams, female instructors are 19% less likely to obtain “excellent” 
overall satisfaction scores compared to male instructors (taking into account the proportion of male 
and female students). These differences are statistically significant. 
 
Furthermore, male students systematically rate male instructors higher, no matter students’ results on 
final exams, as shown in the graph below. 
 
Graph: Correlation between students’ final exam grades and the predicted probability 
of giving an “excellent” overall satisfaction score, by student and instructor gender 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the results of this study suggest that students apply gender stereotypes in the way they respond 
to more specific questions, such as an instructor’s class leadership/quality of animation skills or the 
ability to contribute to students’ intellectual development. 
Given these results, we would like to remind you that your evaluations must exclusively focus on the 
quality of the teaching and must not be influenced by criteria such as the instructor’s gender, age or 
ethnicity. We ask you to pay close attention to these discrimination issues when completing your 
student evaluations. The goal is to avoid a situation in which, for instance, gender-based biases or 
stereotypes would systematically generate lower evaluations for women instructors compared to their 
male colleagues. 
Best regards, 
Hélène Kloeckner 
Chargée de la communication interne / Référente égalité femmes-hommes 
 
Direction de la communication / Secrétariat général 
27 rue Saint-Guillaume 75337 Paris cedex 07 France 
T. +33 (0)1 45 49 59 86 / M. +33 (0)6 73 76 32 96 
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helene.kloeckner@sciencespo.fr 
www.sciencespo.fr  
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